

**JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM**

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TO : WASHINGTON HONOLULU  
FROM : SAIGON 0966, 17 SEPTEMBER 1963

1. AFTER MAKING AND BREAKING FOUR APPOINTMENTS WITH CAS OFFICER, [ ] SENT MESSAGE ON 5 SEPT VIA [ ] THAT HE CONSIDERED IT BEST IN PRESENT CLIMATE THAT CAS OFFICER NOT COME TO [ ] OWING HEAVY SURVEILLANCE. TRANSPARENCY THIS EXCUSE INDICATED BY ASSURANCES THAT [ ] THOUGHT IT PERFECTLY IN ORDER TO CONTINUE VISIT HIS [ ] [ ] NOT MORE THAN FIFTY FEET FROM MAIN GATE. ONE SURVEILLANCE WOULD COVER BOTH.

2. IN HOUR CONVERSATION [ ] AND CAS OFFICER WENT OVER VARIOUS SUBJECTS, FIRST BEING ARTICLE ON CAS IN VIETNAM TIMES, AND CAS OFFICER ASKED [ ] TO GIVE [ ] FULL ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION. CAS OFFICER POINTED OUT THAT LIKE MOST EXPOSES THIS WAS MISHMASH OF FACT AND FANCY, THAT TO EXTENT IT WAS ACCURATE THE WRITER DISCUSSED [ ] WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY U.S. AND GVN, IN MOST CASES BY [ ] IT WOULD THEREFORE BE HEIGHT OF ILLOGIC FOR U.S. TO SPEND LARGE SUMS AND EFFORTS ON BEHALF GOVERNMENT WHICH WE SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTEMPTING OVERTHROW. CAS OFFICER TOLD [ ] TO TELL [ ] THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES CAS HAD NO CHOICE BUT REVIEW ALL PROJECTS.

3. [ ] BROUGHT VARIOUS MESSAGES ON WHICH [ ] ASKED FOR CAS OFFICER'S OPINION. FIRST WAS QUERY WHETHER CAS OFFICER AGREED WITH [ ] THAT PRES KENNEDY ERRED IN STATING GVN OUT OF TOUCH WITH PEOPLE AND ALSO THAT BUDDHISTS BEING REPRESSED. CAS OFFICER SAID HE DISAGREED [ ] ON BOTH COUNTS AND CONCURRED

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COMPLETELY WITH PRES KENNEDY, CITING IN BOTH CASES EARLIER AND FAIRLY DETAILED CONVERSATIONS WITH [ ] WHO HAD SPOKEN STRONGLY AGAINST GVN FOR HANDLING OF BUDDHISTS AND ALSO DENOUNCED DIEM AND NHU BY NAME FOR MOUTHING THEORIES WHICH WERE MEANINGLESS TO POPULATION, WHO [ ] HAD LOST 150,000 KILLED IN PAST TEN YEARS. IT DISAPPOINTING TO SEE SUCH CRAVEN, [ ] CHANGE OF HEART ON PART OF SENIOR AND INTELLIGENT OFFICER, AND NOT SURPRISING HE EMBARRASSED DELIVER SUCH OPINIONS PERSONALLY. STATION HAS HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH [ ] OFFICER SINCE 5 SEPTEMBER.

4. APART FROM FOREGOING, STATION IS TAKING GOOD LOOK AT

[ ] FOR ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY POSSIBLE [ ]

[ ]

HAS ALWAYS PROVIDED [ ] TO STATION PER OUR SPECIFICATIONS, BUT THEY COULD OBVIOUSLY BE MEANINGLESS SINCE [ ] CANNOT BE CHECKED. REQUEST HQS RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL STATION [ ] HAVE HAD CHANCE TO PIN DOWN. NEXT STEPS INCLUDE CONSULTATION [ ] (NOTE: THIS HANDLED WITH [ ] WHO HAS FULL CAS CLEARANCE), FOLLOWED BY JOINT MEETING WITH [ ] AND REQUEST FOR EXPLANATIONS WHERE NECESSARY. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER [ ] CAN BE PROVED, STATION [ ] HAVE TENTATIVELY AND INFORMALLY CONCLUDED THAT BEST GENERAL GROUND RULES WILL BE FOR [ ]

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SUPPORT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
ALTHOUGH THIS SOLUTION MAY BE TOO PAT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE

[REDACTED] AT LEAST

THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT ARISEN YET. EFFECT OF THIS TYPE ARRANGEMENT  
WILL BE FOR STATION TO CONCENTRATE ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATION

WILL ADVISE SOONEST, PROBABLY WITHIN WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

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